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Food Prices and the Politics of 
Hunger: Beneath Market and State
Haris Gazdar
Abstract What accounts for the persistence of hunger and undernutrition in political and administrative 
systems which might be otherwise sensitive to the risk of food price volatility and market failure? If 
pre-empting food price volatility has a political constituency why is there not a similar constituency for 
preventing vulnerability to hunger? The policy response to globally-driven food price volatility in Pakistan 
was largely successful in achieving its proximate goals, and price spirals and market shortages in 2008 
were aberrations from which lessons were drawn effectively. Research for the Life in a Time of Food Price 
Volatility project shows that the food economy of the poorest is relatively insulated from price fluctuations, 
and vulnerability to hunger is mostly driven by idiosyncratic shocks. The poorest often operate beneath the 
market, or at the lowest rung of a highly segmented market, and their expectations with respect to rights 
and entitlements to food correspond with their prevailing sources of informal social support.
1 Introduction
Pakistan does poorly with respect to most indicators 
of  hunger and food security and the persistence 
of  undernutrition in the country is at least partly 
attributed to inadequate food consumption. 
According to statistics compiled by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), while there had 
been a steady decline in the ratio since 2001, around 
a sixth of  the population remained undernourished 
(Balagamwala and Gazdar 2014). In the nationally 
representative National Nutrition Survey of  2011 
three-tenths of  the respondents reported that 
household members had faced hunger at some time 
in the year, with a tenth saying that children had also 
gone hungry. Shortfalls in calorie consumption as 
well as periods of  vulnerability to hunger, therefore, 
continued to affect 10–30 per cent of  the population 
(Aga Khan University 2011).
The food crisis of  2007–09 revealed a political and 
administrative system which was not only responsive 
to price volatility but was effective, for the most 
part, in stabilising prices and preventing market 
failure. What accounts for the persistence of  hunger 
and undernutrition in political and administrative 
systems which might otherwise be sensitive to the 
risk of  price volatility and market failure with respect 
to essential food commodities? This article aims to 
answer this question using an understanding of  the 
food economy of  the poorest developed through 
a longitudinal qualitative study in rural and urban 
areas of  Pakistan as part of  the Life in a Time of  
Food Price Volatility project over the course of  
three years. The research examined the impact of  
food price volatility (FPV) on the poor in urban 
and rural areas through longitudinal case studies of  
20 households, selected key informant interviews 
and focus group discussions (FGDs) with young and 
older women and men in the survey communities. 
The selection of  study sites and households within 
these sites was premised on a focus on the poorest 
and socially marginalised. The rural fieldwork site 
consisted of  villages in three administrative units 
of  Taluka Johi of  Dadu District, Sindh Province, 
which are situated about 15km from the district 
headquarters. Agriculture is the main source of  
livelihood in this area, but lack of  irrigation water 
means that there is only one crop (winter wheat) 
through the annual cycle. Some of  the communities 
are dominated by large landlords who also wield 
political influence. For our urban site low-income 
neighbourhoods in Union Council 12 of  Gulshan-
e-Iqbal Town in Karachi were selected. This part of  
the city is a predominantly working class area with 
an ethnically mixed population, and with relatively 
good access to infrastructure and public services.
In this article, we argue that the food economy of  
the poorest is only partly dependent on markets 
and prices. As such, an implicit social contract that 
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ensures stability in prices bypasses a large segment 
of  the population which remains vulnerable to 
hunger beneath the market.
Thus, Section 2 describes the impact of  the global 
food price crisis and its management in Pakistan and 
outlines the nature of  the implicit social contract 
and its lapses. The food economy of  the poorest is 
described in Section 3, which summarises qualitative 
findings from the FPV project on hunger, coping 
behaviour and informal social protection, and shows 
the relative insulation of  the poorest from prices and 
markets. Section 4 examines observations from the 
FPV project on perceptions about accountability 
with respect to hunger, and how rights and 
entitlements to food and nutrition are understood by 
the poor. Conclusions are offered in Section 5.
2 The food price crisis and its aftermath: global 
to national linkages and their management
The global food price crisis of  2007–09 brought into 
relief  the linkages between the global and national 
economies, and also the politics of  the policy 
response. The three-year period from February 
2007 to March 2010 during which global food and 
fuel prices rose saw particularly unstable prices 
in Pakistan (see Figure 1). During this time, the 
monthly inflation rate measured using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) peaked at 3 per cent.
In the calendar years 2007 and 2008 the monthly 
inflation rates of  key food items such as wheat 
(the main staple) were even more volatile than 
the general price indices (see Figure 2). While 
the monthly inflation rate measured using the 
Sensitive Price Indicator (SPI) peaked at 5 per cent 
in April 2008, monthly wheat price inflation was 
at or above the 5 per cent mark for ten out of  the 
22 months covered. The closing months of  2007 
saw the sharpest rises in wheat prices, coinciding 
with domestic shortages, high international prices, 
and suspicions of  speculative collusive hoarding of  
wheat stocks by private parties. The presence of  such 
distortions in the domestic market was acknowledged 
when the central bank banned bank borrowing for 
the purchase of  wheat stocks (Iqbal 2007). It was 
suspected that speculative activity was financed by 
borrowing funds from commercial banks.
The government has historically purchased 10–20 
per cent of  the wheat harvest at a pre-announced 
procurement or support price to maintain public 
stocks of  the staple grain. This is supposed to 
serve two purposes: first, a support price guarantee 
assures a predictable return to wheat growers, and 
second, the government releases grain from its stock 
to millers at this control price, thus providing a 
consumer subsidy by absorbing the cost of  storage 
and transportation. Wheat is sown from November 
Figure 1 Monthly inflation rates February 2007 to March 2010 – three-month moving average
Source Gazdar and Mallah (2010) based on Economic Survey (various years).1
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onwards and harvested during March and April. For 
the procurement price to act as an effective signal 
to growers, it is usually announced in October. As 
world prices began to rise in the middle of  2007, it 
was expected that the government would announce 
a significant hike in the procurement price for the 
2008 harvest. In fact, no such announcement was 
made. Domestic prices followed the world market 
and by December 2007–January 2008 a crisis had 
erupted in the local markets as supplies dried up due 
to speculative hoarding by traders.
The food crisis in Pakistan coincided with a moment 
of  political uncertainty and turmoil. General Pervez 
Musharraf ’s military regime which had been in 
power since 1999 faced popular protests from March 
2007 onwards. The assassination of  former Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto in December led to violent 
strikes and shutdowns. The food situation, therefore, 
was one of  many crises that the government of  
the time faced as it saw its authority challenged. 
Administrative and regulatory measures exacerbated 
rather than alleviated shortages, and the government 
ultimately intervened directly by dumping large 
quantities of  highly subsidised imported wheat 
flour to restore the market. Perceptions that the 
government had mishandled the management of  
food markets, and particularly the market for the key 
staple, further eroded the legitimacy of  the military 
regime.
A new government took office in March 2008 
following general elections, and promptly 
appointed a National Task Force on Food Security 
to investigate the causes of  the food crisis and to 
offer recommendations. The Task Force found that 
the failure to raise the wheat procurement price 
in line with emerging global trends in 2007 had 
exacerbated price volatility in Pakistan, leading 
to hoarding, shortages and price spirals which 
were then broken with the use of  expensive wheat 
imports. The Task Force recommended that the 
wheat procurement policy should aim to cushion the 
impact of  global price volatility on local markets. 
It made explicit something which was already 
known and understood: growers responded to price 
signals, and it was impossible to insulate the national 
economy from global food prices, particularly due 
to active trade across the county’s western borders. 
The wheat support price was raised and has been 
renewed on an annual basis with a view on world 
prices. The new government also introduced a 
cash transfer programme targeted to women in 
poor households (the Benazir Income Support 
Programme, or BISP). While it came to be seen as a 
flagship social protection scheme, the initial rationale 
for the programme was to provide food security at a 
time of  rising food prices (Gazdar 2011).
The Musharraf  government had correctly 
anticipated that announcing a higher wheat 
Figure 2 Monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI), Sensitive Price Indicator (SPI) and wheat inflation rates, February 2007 
to November 2008 – three-month moving average
Source Gazdar and Mallah (2010) based on Federal Bureau of Statistics (various years),2 ‘Monthly Review of Prices’3 
and Economic Survey (various years).4
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support price in October 2007 for the March–April 
2008 harvest would lead to an immediate rise in 
market prices. Its popularity already in decline, 
the government was nervous about the political 
impact of  a price change, and this, in part, was a 
cause of  indecisiveness.5 But the food crisis showed 
that price spikes and market shortages can have 
bigger economic and political costs to government 
than a managed transfer of  global price changes to 
consumers. The initial attempt to insulate consumers 
from the change in global price levels proved, 
ultimately, to be futile as domestic prices did finally 
rise. The fact that the government was seen as being 
unprepared for this eventuality led to hoarding and 
shortages, and domestic price movements ended 
up being even more volatile than global prices. Far 
from preventing a political fallout from global prices, 
the military regime lost further legitimacy as it was 
perceived as being weak and indifferent. The findings 
and recommendations of  the National Task Force 
on Food Security were readily accepted because 
they were in line with the prior understanding 
within government circles – among politicians and 
bureaucrats alike – that the state’s primary task with 
respect to food security is to ensure price stability and 
avert shortages. The Musharraf  government was 
seen as having defaulted on this obligation.
Concern about price volatility and market failure 
was built into the everyday running of  government 
well before the food crisis of  2007–08. The 
Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of  
the Cabinet is a powerful organ of  the federal 
government and meets every two weeks to 
coordinate fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Tahir 
2005). One of  its key tasks is to act as a watchdog 
on prices and shortages. The ECC regularly 
reviews the markets and price data supplied by 
over three dozen reporting stations of  the Pakistan 
Bureau of  Statistics spread across the country, and 
is empowered to intervene to prevent price spikes 
and shortages (Prikhodko and Zrilyi 2013; PBS 
2012). Its focus is on ‘essential commodities’ such as 
wheat/wheat flour, cooking oil, sugar, tea, onions 
and potatoes – items that make up the basic food 
basket of  the poor, but not necessarily nutritious 
foods. At lower tiers (provincial and municipal) 
the administrative machinery is also geared up for 
monitoring and regulating the prices and availability 
of  ‘essential commodities’. The title of  the provincial 
law under which the monitoring agency operates 
– the ‘Sindh Essential Commodities Price Control 
and Prevention of  Profiteering and Hoarding 
Act of  2005’ – makes clear how the mandate of  
government is understood.
Pakistan’s political and administrative systems are 
attentive to price shocks of  what are regarded 
as essential food commodities and there are 
mechanisms in place to monitor prices and to 
take prompt remedial action. The brief  moment 
of  breakdown in 2008 and the steps taken in its 
aftermath are instructive of  the implied social 
contract which exists in the country around food 
security: it is predicated on preventing price spikes, 
spirals and shortages, in other words market 
breakdown, for ‘essential commodities’.
3 Insulation from prices: the food economy of 
the poorest
3.1 Hunger and food security
In the course of  our research, most of  the 
households in both Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town in 
Karachi and Dadu District, Sindh Province areas 
reported some degree of  vulnerability to hunger. 
Most households had faced hunger at least once in 
the preceding year, a condition which, according 
to the nationally representative National Nutrition 
Survey (NNS) 2011, corresponded with the 
experience of  10–30 per cent of  the population.
Rural and urban informants in our fieldwork sites 
are similar in terms of  the way in which food 
consumption priorities are discussed. Acquisition 
of  the main staple (wheat flour) is the primary 
concern of  most households. When urban and rural 
informants said they had ‘nothing to eat’, it was 
sometimes the case that they did not have a sufficient 
quantity of  the main staple – roti (wheat flour 
flatbread). Further probing revealed, however, that 
having ‘nothing to eat’ often meant that there was 
roti but nothing to accompany it. Hunger is closely 
associated with frugality in terms of  the lack of  
dietary diversity and micronutrient deficient intakes. 
Chutney made with salt and raw chillies, and 
sweetened black tea, are common accompaniments. 
Milk, if  available, might be added to the tea. These 
accompaniments are used to make the simple roti 
more palatable. In the rural site there is also the use 
of  lassi (buttermilk), which can be available free of  
cost from neighbours.6
In the rural site hunger occurs, for the most part, in 
the lean season, or when harvested grain runs out. 
Households’ stocks of  grain from their own farms, 
from harvest labour, or from alms and charity, see 
them through part of  the year. Even though these 
households may have access to grain loans from 
landlords or shopkeepers, they are unable to fully 
stave off hunger while they make arrangements for 
alms or loans. There are also some households who 
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rely on frequent purchases of  flour, much like a poor 
urban household. These households can experience 
hunger regardless of  the agricultural cycle, because 
they rely entirely on cash purchases from retail 
outlets for their staple food.
Households in the urban site are more dependent on 
the market for their food. There were some urban 
households with rural links who received grain from 
the village. For the most part, however, even recent 
rural–urban migrants in our urban site were entirely 
dependent on local purchasing. Urban households 
with government jobs, like their rural counterparts, 
plan their food acquisition over the monthly salary 
cycle. Others rely on more frequent purchasing 
from local retailers. Although urban households are 
somewhat better off than their rural counterparts in 
terms of  work opportunities, the poorest here also 
experience hunger at least on some days. In fact, 
their risk of  hunger is spread more evenly across the 
year with hungry days occurring due to the lack of  
cash on a day-to-day basis.
The shocks that affect the lives and food security 
of  the poorest are mostly idiosyncratic in nature – 
though some of  these have linkages with broader 
economic and political trends. Illness, injury, the 
loss of  a job, finding new employment, rural–urban 
migration, changing residence within the city, 
changes in family composition, family disputes and 
disruptions in social arrangements, are the types of  
events which lead to hungry days. In many cases 
these events or circumstances are correlated. The 
loss of  a job, for example, can be associated with 
domestic violence and family breakdown. A dispute 
with a better-off relative can lead to the loss of  
livelihood and other forms of  support, and even 
eviction from rent-free accommodation. Migration 
to the city for a job can be associated with the 
breakdown of  a family, its later consolidation, and 
then its dispersal once again. A family member 
gaining public sector employment can lead to 
immediate improvements in creditworthiness and 
a rise in social stature among close relatives. All of  
these are actual examples from our respondents over 
the period that we visited them.
3.2 Staving off hunger and coping on hungry days
The household is ordinarily seen as a unit of  
consumption and welfare and the household budget 
as a measure of  wellbeing. A closer view of  the 
actual eating and food sharing arrangements in 
which individuals are involved reveals much fluidity 
across household boundaries. This is particularly 
true of  households and individuals surviving on the 
margins of  food insecurity and hunger. Mrs M., a 
37-year-old urban factory worker urban informant, 
who sends her children to eat at her mother’s house 
whenever there is not enough to eat is typical of  the 
way in which the household breaks down as a unit 
of  food consumption at moments of  crisis. At the 
other end of  the spectrum, in the same locality, a 
relatively well-off informant, the 36-year-old Mrs G., 
had invited a poor niece from the village to come 
and stay with her. The girl did household chores and 
was looked after in terms of  food and other needs.
Apart from relatives, the main sources of  informal 
local support in the face of  adverse food shocks 
came from neighbours in the urban area, and the 
wider kinship group as well as landlords and patrons 
in the rural site. Some of  the food sharing between 
urban and rural neighbours is not a response to an 
adverse shock, but simply an institutionalised form 
of  circulation. It is also common for small quantities 
of  cooked food to be sent to neighbours, particularly 
if  something special has been prepared. There may 
be a religious element to such circulation, as food 
items that are made for special events are thought 
to bring blessings if  shared with neighbours and 
relatives and there may be a seasonal element as 
well, since charitable giving increases during periods 
of  religious significance. In any case, some of  the 
sharing of  cooked foods is part of  the reciprocal 
exchange between people of  similar status.
This form of  reciprocal exchange often overlaps 
with charitable assistance. Since the motive of  the 
giver might be religious blessings in both such cases, 
the boundaries between the two can be blurred. 
The difference is that in the case of  charitable 
assistance, the giver and the receiver are both aware 
that reciprocity is not required. If  the recipient 
is undergoing transitory distress there may be an 
implied understanding that in time she or he will be 
counted among peers again.
Beyond a point, however, the hierarchy of  status 
between the giver and the receiver is clearly 
understood in terms of  dependence and social 
obligation. While the circulation of  food (particularly 
wheat loans, or even charity) in the rural area 
makes up for relative food security, it is also seen as 
a social cost. Mrs K.,7 a 47-year-old rural–urban 
migrant in the Karachi fieldwork site, reflected on 
the availability of  the staple in the village compared 
with greater insecurity in the city: ‘This (urban) 
hunger is a blessing compared with being fed but 
also humiliated in the village by the patron’.
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Just as there is overlap between food circulation 
between peers and charitable giving, so there 
appears to be a grey area between charitable 
giving and begging. At the far end are professional 
beggars who are candid that living off alms is 
their traditional occupation. We had at least one 
such case in each of  the two sites. Then there are 
those who are very poor or have fallen on hard 
times, and regularly depend on alms for their food 
consumption. Children play a key role, as in the case 
of  fluid household boundaries, in the circulation 
of  food even with respect to charity and alms. It is 
socially more acceptable for children to go over to 
houses of  neighbours and ask for any spare food 
than it is for adults.
The food economy of  the poorest on normal as well 
as hungry days can be somewhat insulated from food 
markets and prices. This is only because at extreme 
levels of  poverty where food security is seen almost 
exclusively in terms of  adequate quantities of  bread 
or wheat flour, even basic accompaniments such 
as vegetables and lentils, which might be acquired 
from the market are seen as luxuries. For households 
which rely on the market the main source of  
vulnerability to their purchasing power, besides the 
price, is the income earned on the day. Many of  
the poorest are already part of  a moral economy 
in which their need for the basic staple will mostly 
be met through some combination of  sharing, 
charity and begging. Price changes are transmitted 
relatively quickly from global to local markets, 
but the food economy of  the poorest is not always 
denominated in money terms. This is not to say, of  
course, that price increases or price volatility do not 
affect the food security of  the poorest. But for those 
whose primary economic goal is to simply acquire 
a minimum quantity of  staple food, the impact of  
prices and markets is transmitted through other 
mediating institutions and informal support systems.
While the food economy of  the poor, which 
includes not only livelihood strategies but also social 
networks, provides protection from chronic hunger, 
it has three sets of  salient implications. First, the 
presence of  informal support systems might protect 
individuals from outright starvation, but not from 
temporary vulnerability to hunger. Second, the 
food economy of  the poor holds individuals and 
households in an implicit social contract, which 
involves dependence, subservience and loss of  
status and agency. Mostly avoiding hunger, while 
remaining vulnerable to it, restricts options in all 
spheres of  life, including family relations. Third, 
the overriding focus on avoiding hunger means 
that there remains a significant segment of  the 
population for which concerns such as dietary 
diversity and the consumption of  nutritious foods 
assume a lower priority.
The payment modality of  the main social protection 
programme of  the federal government (BISP) is 
based on the transfer of  quarterly instalments. 
Hunger and food insecurity as experienced by 
the poorest, however, are at moments of  crisis 
triggered by seasonality, individual or household 
contingencies such as ill-health or injury, loss of  
job, and disruptions in intra-household and wider 
social relations. While the food economy of  the poor 
generally ensures the avoidance of  hunger, it does 
not fully insure them against a hungry day. The 
fact that the cash transfer programme payments 
arrive at intervals of  three months means that the 
programme staves off idiosyncratic hungry days 
only indirectly though the somewhat improved 
creditworthiness of  beneficiaries with local retailers. 
Respondents report eating better on days when they 
receive their BISP payment, but the programme is 
unable, in its current form, to insure against hungry 
days if  they happen to occur at other times.
The food economy of  the poorest, therefore, 
operates beneath both the market and the state, for 
the most part. Prices have only a partial effect on 
the food security of  the poorest who rely on a range 
of  channels, many of  them non-monetary ones, for 
their access to basic foods. Formal social protection, 
although successful in its outreach to the poorest, is 
also not a reliable foil against hungry days.
4 Rights, entitlements and the politics of hunger
FPV research provided insights into how the poor 
understand their rights and entitlements with respect 
to food. There was consensus among respondents 
that everyone had a right to food regardless of  age, 
gender and social status. This ‘right’, however, was 
understood in consequentialist terms. Men had a 
right to food because they went out to earn and 
provided for their families; women had a right to 
food as they took care of  the household and of  
children and if  they did not get sufficient food an 
impact would be felt on others; and children had 
a right to food because they were young/innocent 
and could not fend for themselves. The right to food 
was not understood by our respondents as a specific 
legal or political entitlement individuals enjoyed as 
citizens of  a state.
When asked who was responsible for ensuring 
that individuals did not go hungry, respondents 
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identified a range of  possible providers including 
God, household, community and the government. 
For some, God was responsible for ensuring there 
was enough food for individuals. Others felt that 
while God was responsible, individuals could not 
completely rely on His mercy and needed to make 
an effort to ensure they, and those for whom they 
were actually responsible, were fed. At the household 
level, there was a gendered division of  roles whereby 
the husband or other male members had the 
responsibility to provide for women and children and 
in return women carried out care duties and looked 
after their husband and children. As the 60-year-old 
Mrs Z.,8 who subsists on begging in the rural site put 
it: ‘Whether one begs or earns, it is the responsibility 
of  the head of  the household to feed his family’.
When our respondents did actually mention a 
specific role for government with respect to food 
security, it was in terms of  prices and shortages – 
more or less the terms of  the implied social contract 
which appears to guide government action. While in 
our research sites there was no explicit mention or 
awareness of  the price control system, respondents 
did feel that food price inflation takes place because 
retailers and traders charge high rates to make large 
profits at the expense of  the consumers. There was 
also a feeling that the government’s responsibility 
should be limited to creating an environment where 
jobs are available and there is employment for all, so 
that individuals are able to provide for themselves. 
However, a sense of  helplessness was prevalent 
among respondents as they felt that because of  
their poverty they lacked power to be able to voice 
their opinions. According to one of  our household 
interview respondents in Karachi, they explained 
that it is better to stay quiet and at home and 
work hard to earn income rather than try to hold 
someone accountable for hunger.
These observations from our FPV ‘listening posts’ 
are supported by a broader view of  political 
mobilisation and articulation in Pakistan. Hunger 
or vulnerability to hunger did not become political 
issues in an otherwise competitive, even aggressively 
fought, election campaign in 2013. It is not as 
though consumer-related concerns were absent from 
the political debate. The government was held to 
account over shortages of  electricity and subsidised 
fuel.
5 Conclusion
There is no contradiction between the absence 
of  a political constituency for the eradication of  
hunger and undernutrition on the one hand, and the 
existence, on the other hand, of  an implicit social 
contract on food security which appears to hold and 
deliver. Popular perceptions of  food security as the 
ability to fill the belly of  children, regardless of  the 
nutritional adequacy and quality of  the diet, are 
largely in agreement with policymakers’ focus on 
‘essential’ foods such as wheat. Government systems, 
representative as well as administrative ones, are 
also in concurrence with the societal view that the 
main job of  the state is to ensure the predictability 
of  prices, prevent shortages and act against blatant 
profiteering.
The informal social support systems which sustain 
the poorest are premised on a different implicit 
social contract – one that combines reciprocity, 
patronage and charity, all of  which include a 
transactional dimension. It might be argued that the 
coexistence of  these two types of  social contract – 
one based on market functioning, the other on the 
circulation of  food within as well as outside market 
mechanisms – allows the mainstream representative 
and administrative systems to carry on functioning 
relatively smoothly while ignoring vulnerability to 
hunger and undernutrition.
Notes
1 See www.finance.gov.pk.
2 See www.pbs.gov.pk, the Pakistan Bureau 
of  Statistics, formerly the Federal Bureau of  
Statistics.
3 See www.pbs.gov.pk/cpi.
4 See www.finance.gov.pk.
5 There was a similar reluctance to pass on fuel 
price increases, resulting also in heavy losses to 
the exchequer.
6 The free circulation of  lassi among neighbours 
appears to be a remnant of  a wider moral 
economy in rural communities around surplus 
fresh milk and other perishable dairy products. 
The increasing commodification of  fresh milk has 
led to a decline in its circulation.
7 Interview, 22 October 2012, Karachi.
8 Interview, 25 September 2013, Dadu District.
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